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When Turkey was trying to recover from the 2001 financial crisis and reform efforts by the European 
Union (EU) were gaining momentum, the 
secretary general of the powerful National 
Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, 
MGK), General Tuncer Kılınç, claimed 
during a conference at the Istanbul Military 
Academies Directorate on March 7, 2002, 
that he opposed Turkey’s membership in 
the EU, adding:
Turkey absolutely needs to seek new 
alliances. In my opinion, the best 
direction would be to seek an alliance 
with the Russian Federation, which 
would include Iran, without ignor-
ing the United States — if possible. 
Turkey has not received any help from 
the European Union. The European 
Union has negative approaches to the 
problems that concern Turkey.1
 This statement caused shock; the army 
was thought to support, if not Turkey’s 
democratic consolidation, at least its 
Western orientation. Some years later, the 
unraveling of the Ergenekon affair showed 
that Kılınç was not a “black swan.” As 
EU-Turkey relations improved in the early 
2000s, a new thread of Turkish nationalism 
emerged, a paradoxical mix of Kemalism 
and anti-Westernism that found support in 
military ranks, posed additional obstacles 
to Turkey’s reform process and threatened 
its democratic regime per se.
 Such opinions came as a surprise to 
many.  At a moment when the Western and 
democratic credentials of Turkish politi-
cal Islam were questioned by the Kemalist 
media, the army was seen as an anchor 
of the country’s Western orientation. And 
then, one of the country’s most senior mili-
tary officers appeared to prefer Turkey’s 
alliance with Russia, the archenemy of the 
Ottoman Empire, or — even more bizarre-
ly — with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 
fact, Kılınç was not alone in his aberration 
from the Western vision of Kemalist ortho-
doxy. When the process of Turkey’s Eu-
ropean integration made clear that its full 
membership in the European Union would 
require the end of the military’s tutelage 
over Turkish politics and society, some 
officers opted for the preservation of their 
institutional prerogatives. Advancing an 
anti-Western, isolationist agenda would se-
cure the survival of the Kemalist status quo 
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and also bring Turkey closer to states that 
are strong but not famous for their demo-
cratic credentials, such as Russia and Iran. 
What came to be known as Turkey’s neo-
nationalism, or ulusalcılık as it is referred 
to in Turky, combines the anti-democratic 
elements of the Kemalist bureaucracy with 
the anti-Western attitudes of traditional 
political Islam, the far right and the far left. 
This synthesis, which Kılınç personified, 
has been a pervasive feature of Turkey’s 
disparate anti-EU alliance. Its traces can 
be found in the Ergenekon affair, which is 
explored below.
The ArgumenT
 Nationalism is one of the most endur-
ing themes of Turkish politics, but it is by 
no means static. This study aims to explore 
one of its most salient recent mutations, 
neo-nationalism. It will explore its his-
torical roots and relations with traditional 
currents of Turkish nationalism, as well as 
its domestic and foreign-policy implica-
tions. The Ergenekon affair is examined 
as a case demonstrating the strength of the 
neo-nationalist movement as well as the 
threat that it could pose for Turkish democ-
racy. This study argues that ulusalcılık is 
distinct from traditional versions of nation-
alism, as it simultaneously claims loyalty to 
Kemalist orthodoxy and opposes Turkey’s 
Westernization. As strict ideological divi-
sions that caused serious clashes during 
the 1970s dissipated in the aftermath of the 
Cold War, it became possible for leftist and 
rightist forces to collaborate to avert what 
they see as the biggest threat, Turkey’s 
European integration. It also comprises an 
interesting example of how “uncivil soci-
ety,”2 which opposes globalization, often 
benefits from it and adjusts its message 
and operating methods to new social and 
economic circumstances. 
 This study focuses on the controversial 
Ergenekon affair because it highlights the 
relevance of ulusalcılık to Turkish politics. 
Ulusalcılık feeds on the chronic trust deficit 
that has characterized Turkey’s relations 
with its neighbors but has now come to 
shape relations between Turkey’s religious 
conservative and secularist classes. The 
Ergenekon affair indicates the threat that 
an unprecedented alliance of disparate elite 
and underdog social elements could pose 
to the prospect of Turkey’s democratic 
consolidation and European integration. It 
also documents an emerging fragmentation 
within the ranks of the Turkish military and 
judiciary regarding the continuation of the 
tutelary role of the Turkish bureaucracy.   
hisToricAl rooTs 
The left
 Thanks to the relatively liberal politi-
cal framework set by the 1961 constitution, 
a vibrant ideological openness character-
ized Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Yön (Direction) Movement was one of the 
leftist groups founded in the 1960s under 
the leadership of Doğan Avcıoğlu and 
Mümtaz Soysal. Yön had a close relation-
ship with the bureaucracy, as well as the 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi, CHP). It can be defined as a 
leftist-nationalist movement that defended 
Turkish exceptionalism, anti-imperialism 
— a.k.a. Westernism — and Jacobinism.3 
 Another major leftist trend was the 
National Democratic Revolution movement 
(Milli Demokratik Devrim, MDD), which 
emerged from the ranks of the Labor Party 
(İşçi Partisi, İP). The end of the Cold War 
brought radical change to MDD as well 
as to Yön. Nationalism came to stand for 
socialist ideals and provide a raison d’être 
for the continuation of these movements. 
While still embracing socialism, the leading 
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hand, it caused a rift in domestic politics 
by confronting the anti-Islamic legacy of 
the Atatürk reforms. 
 By the mid-1970s, the impact of these 
ideas was felt in state policies. Aydınlar 
Ocağı did not identify with one political 
party. While its nationalism and Islamic 
arguments appealed to parties such as the 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi, MHP), its base was impatient with 
its elitist and statist positions. The 1980 
coup d’état became a windfall opportu-
nity for Aydınlar Ocağı.8 Its ideas gained 
an unexpected prevalence and legitimacy 
when the military regime of General Kenan 
Evren9 adopted the Turkish-Islamic Syn-
thesis as its official ideology.10 The group 
blossomed with the rise to power of Tur-
gut Özal, said to be one of the prominent 
members of the group.  During his tenure as 
prime minister, many other members were 
appointed to high positions in the state bu-
reaucracies and universities.11 Leftist groups 
viewed these developments as a direct 
threat to the secular nature of the state. 
 In due course, following the departure 
of Evren, the military also grew increasing-
ly concerned about the rising role of Islam 
in state and society. Yet the pace of trans-
formation soon surpassed Aydınlar Ocağı. 
Özal and his Motherland Party (Anavatan 
Partisi, ANAP) were moving towards a 
more pragmatic approach with the chang-
ing world order after the Cold War. The 
strict conservative principles of Aydınlar 
Ocağı no longer resonated with the public. 
Although its political significance waned, 
its legacy can still be traced in several 
anti-EU arguments.  During the 1970s and 
1980s, it popularized ideas that are com-
mon today among Turkish nationalists, 
such as the conventional wisdom that the 
West plans to destabilize Turkey by rekin-
dling the Kurdish and Armenian issues.12
magazine of the MDD movement, Aydınlık, 
gradually adopted a nationalist, anti-impe-
rialist, national-unionist, anti-Kurdish, anti-
Islamic rhetoric and claimed to represent 
Kemalist orthodoxy in the arena of civil-
ian politics.4 Anti-imperialism became the 
bridge that linked leftism and nationalism. 
Although this transformation was gradu-
ally alienating them from their European 
counterparts, it facilitated their reconcilia-
tion on a common anti-Western, national-
ist agenda embroidered with fragments 
of their old leftist ideology. By the end of 
the 1990s, they formed a political agenda 
that vehemently opposed those whom they 
called enemies within (iç düşman), collabo-
rators with the Western imperialist plans for 
Turkey. The latter included the liberals and, 
most important, the Justice and Develop-
ment Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
AKP), founded in 2001 on Islamist political 
roots that did not prevent it from launching 
a radical EU reform program when it came 
to power in November 2002.
The right
 Throughout the 1960s, rightist intel-
lectuals tried to make a strong argument 
to counterbalance the dominant leftist 
discourse. In 1970, the “Intellectuals-
Hearth” (Aydınlar Ocağı) was formed to 
defend the “national culture” against leftist 
ideas. Its ideology was crystallized under 
the leadership of Ibrahim Kafesoğlu, who 
conceptualized the core of the “Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis” (Türk-İslam Sentezi),5 
aimed at reconciling Turkishness with 
Islam by claiming that the Turks con-
verted to Islam voluntarily and revived and 
spread the religion in Ottoman times.6 At 
the international level, the Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis underlined Turkey’s soft power 
through its emphasis on Ottoman history 
and its rich Islamic culture.7 On the other 
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globalization. In an environment like 
this, leftists reconciled with the pan-
Turkists (Türkçü).13 
 Yön and Aydınlar Ocağı14 developed 
a common vocabulary for virtually all key 
political issues: the Kurdish question, the 
Cyprus problem, the role of Islam in poli-
tics and society, Turkey’s EU integration 
aspirations, and relations with the United 
States. They saw in any reform attempt 
a Western plot to destroy Turkey.  Their 
aim was to make Turkey powerful while 
fully independent from the West.  The 
mainstream ideology that the new leftists 
adopted was a reinvented version of anti-
imperialist and anti-Western Kemalism, 
whose aim was to save the country from 
its imperialist enemies.15 As a result, the 
distinction between leftist and rightist na-
tionalism has lost a large part of its signifi-
cance.16 The old, violent ideological clashes 
over communism and Islamism have given 
way to minor disagreements over the roles 
of religion and Kemalism in the state.
 U.S. policy towards the Middle East 
under George W. Bush, the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq, the implications for 
Turkey’s Kurdish question, the increasing 
problems in EU-Turkey accession nego-
tiations, and the Cyprus question have all 
facilitated a rise in nationalist sentiment 
since 2005. Books like Those Crazy Turks 
(Şu Çılgın Türkler) and Metal Storm (Met-
al Fırtına) and movies like The Valley of 
the Wolves — Iraq (Kurtlar Vadisi — Irak) 
have enjoyed unprecedented commercial 
success17 and comprise prime examples 
of a popular culture that is aggrandizing 
the new nationalism and mobilizing the 
Turkish public around a “pax Turca.”18 In 
addition, the symbols of nationalism have 
become tools of popular culture and are 
further awakening popular support.19
The red Apple coalition
 The leftist and rightist groups exam-
ined above were at opposing ends of the 
ideological spectrum. Under the polarized 
conditions of the 1960s and especially the 
1970s, ideological opposition took extreme-
ly violent forms. This could not conceal the 
fact that these groups often shared common 
ideas.  Both ends championed elitism and a 
tutelary role for the army in politics and so-
ciety.  In addition, neither supported liberal-
ism; they believed in the absolute priorities 
of the state over individual interests. Last 
but not least, they shared anti-imperialism 
as a guiding principle of their worldview; 
both believed that Turkey is surrounded by 
imperialist enemies trying to break it apart. 
 The end of the Cold War erased the 
basis of discord between the leftist and 
rightist groups. The establishment of a 
communist regime was no longer a hope 
or a threat.  Each group had to reshape 
its ideology in accordance with the new 
political and social conditions. Opposition 
to globalization and the American “new 
world order” became the key rallying point 
for their frustrated young supporters, as can 
be seen in the various ulusalcı publications 
such as Cumhuriyet, Aydınlık and Yeni Çağ. 
This meshed well with their entrenched 
opposition to imperialism. The emergence 
of a de facto common agenda allowed 
for a gradual rapprochement between the 
one-time ideological rivals and indicated 
prospects for cooperation. In the words of a 
rightist professor, Burhan Baloğlu, 
….something called globalization 
has emerged. One of its outcomes is 
the rise of ethno-nationalism both in 
the world and in Turkey. These kinds 
of ethno-nationalism directly aim at 
Turkey. The West is trying to break 
the country apart with the excuse of 
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 Thereby, Kızıl Elma has enjoyed a 
diverse membership, from rightist authors 
to military officers to far-left intellectuals. 
From its ranks, several key figures involved 
in the Ergenekon affair have emerged.
 Ulusalcılık strikes with anti-Western 
rhetoric, despite its claim to Kemalist 
orthodoxy.27 There is constant fear of the 
fragmentation of the country and mistrust 
of  Western states, international organiza-
tions and Turkey’s neighbors. Ulusalcı 
publications are replete with conspiracy 
theories, which usually oscillate around 
the “Sèvres Syndrome.”28 All the great 
powers are accused of planning Turkey’s 
partition through the use of both inter-
nal and external enemies. The European 
Union is considered a key actor in Tur-
key’s disintegration through its promotion 
of a resolution of the Cyprus issue, as 
well as rights for Kurds, Alevis and other 
minorities. The United States is conceived 
as evil, due to its military and political 
involvement in the Middle East. Ulusalcıs 
oppose any cooperation between Turkish 
armed forces and the United States. They 
support isolationism and the development 
of special links with countries like Iran, 
Russia and China, while objecting to any 
change in official foreign-policy positions. 
They object to concessions, negotiation 
and mediation in any of Turkey’s inter-
national disputes. They deeply resent the 
AKP government, which is perceived to 
be pro-EU, to have close relations with 
the United States and to be looking for 
compromise solutions to foreign-policy 
problems.29  Ulusalcı associations30 ac-
cused anyone who would take a liberal 
step in foreign policy as a traitor selling 
out the country and its ideals.  Ulusalcıs 
argue that Turkey is better off alone; any 
kind of alliance with the West undermines 
its power and even stability.
 It is the new Turkish nationalism, 
amalgamated from left and right elements 
since the end of the 1990s,20 that is called 
ulusalcılık.  According to Ferhat Kentel, 
it is “another sub-category of nationalism, 
but its starting point is more recent, and 
it refers to a social-engineering version 
of Turkish modernization, where urban 
lifestyle is turned into a community.”21 
According to the former general secretary 
of the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye 
Komünist Partisi, TKP), Nabi Yağcı, when 
the revolutionary period of the 1920s came 
to an end, Kemalism started to function 
as a status-quo force. While the ideology 
claimed to be the protector of previous 
revolutions, it actually did not promote the 
earlier reforms; it blocked any change that 
threatened the statist understanding. In his 
view, Kemalism lost its leftist essence by 
forgoing change, continually claiming that 
“the regime” was in danger and had to be 
protected from its own people.22
 Ulusalcı figureheads such as Burhan 
Baloğlu and Kemal Çapraz claim that 
Kemalist principles were weakened dur-
ing the Cold War.23  The imperialist West 
took the opportunity to rekindle a fratri-
cidal left-right dispute that dissipated the 
energies of Turkey’s youth.  Following 
the Cold War, young people could focus 
on the realization of a “free, independent 
Turkey.”  The ulusalcıs gathered under the 
Kızıl Elma (Red Apple) Coalition to revive 
the Kuva-i Milliye24 soul and counterbal-
ance the imperialist powers.25 As journalist 
Murat Yetkin explains, 
“Kızıl Elma is a product of Turk-
ish mythology, like Ergenekon. It 
represents a Pan-Turkist ideal.  The 
perception was the gathering of leftist 
nationalists due to the ‘red’ term in it, 
with the Turkist nationalists, for the 
love of the nation.”26  
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Western countries.”33 In the early 2000s, 
the propagation of these ideas was facili-
tated by the rise of “pop-nationalism.” Vic-
tories of national athletes and artists often 
gave nationalist expression an entertaining, 
carnival-like spirit.34  The instrumentaliza-
tion of this spirit peaked in 2007 during the 
“Republic demonstrations” (Cumhuriyet 
Mitingleri), a series of anti-government 
events organized in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir 
and other big cities to oppose the election 
of an AKP candidate to the presidency of 
the Republic of Turkey.
 Being prime examples of “uncivil 
society,” ulusalcı associations were keen on 
using the new technologies, opportunities 
and methods provided by globalization to 
disseminate their political message.35  The 
National Force Association (Kuva-i Milliye 
Derneği), the Great Union of Jurists (Büyük 
Hukukçular Birliği) and the Association 
of Ataturkist Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce 
Derneği) are some of the associations 
that spearheaded the ulusalcı movement.  
Several of them were headed by retired 
officers. These associations have also 
had close links to parties like the İP and 
formerly leftist media, such as the daily 
Cumhuriyet and the magazine Aydınlık. The 
movement garnered strong support from 
the journalist Tuncay Özkan, who turned 
his TV channel, Kanal Türk, into an unof-
ficial organ of the ulusalcı movement and 
also founded the “How many people are 
we” movement (Biz Kaç Kişiyiz Hareketi). 
Ulusalcı mobilization also used the internet 
extensively. New ulusalcı websites and 
forums appeared regularly and became 
popular among Turkish youth.36
 Benefiting from the rising polarization 
of Turkish society, ulusalcı associations 
were able to appeal to a large part of Tur-
key’s secularist middle class. The rallies 
were supposed to be a reaction against the 
 The rise of ulusalcılık was facilitated 
by developments within the Turkish left. 
Until the 1980s, the main ideological de-
bate on the left was about selecting the true 
path towards communism. Following the 
end of the Cold War, disoriented leftists 
sought a new direction by embracing anti-
imperialism.  Maintaining their belief in 
the key political role of social movements, 
they argued that these movements would 
be able to oppose capitalism and globaliza-
tion. By substituting anti-imperialism for 
communism, they soon entered the realm 
of nationalism. The same people who were 
defending the universal values of commu-
nism were now explaining their ideology 
in a national-security framework. Support 
for universalistic ideas receded in favor 
of nationalism.  Leftists were defending 
“the brotherhood of the people” (halkların 
kardeşliği) until the 1980s, but their 
rhetoric in the 1990s turned nationalist, 
anti-minority and xenophobic. Last but not 
least, relations between the leftists and the 
military have changed. Although the left 
never denied the importance of the army, 
the army’s relations with the leftists had 
been rather unfriendly until the 1990s.  The 
military had considered communism one 
of the gravest threats against the republic.31 
However, the shift towards securitization 
has drawn many old leftists to the same 
side as the army.
The mAp of nATionAlism
Ulusalcı Associations
 The seeds of ulusalcılık emerged 
among elite city dwellers and media during 
the 1990s. The new trend was defined as a 
“mutation of Kemalist nationalism in the 
era of globalization.”32 According to the 
journalist Ertuğrul Özkök, ulusalcıs were 
“Western-looking youngsters from the me-
tropolises that will make Turkey one of the 
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lacked cohesion and homogeneity, were 
not able to fully adopt “national and moral 
values,” were insensitive towards Islam, 
and evinced an ideological-moral gap. 
These worries reflected nationalist discom-
fort towards fast-spreading modernization 
and globalization.40  These pop-nationalists, 
unlike the older generation, did not attend 
the Ülkü Ocakları.  Furthermore, they were 
using MHP symbols, although they were 
not affiliated with the party or the “elders” 
of the associations. Despite these concerns, 
nationalist associations loosened their rules 
and engaged their new clientele using their 
symbols or slogans in the protests, football 
matches and so forth. The movement was 
popular both in the slums and among the 
middle- and upper-class city dwellers. This 
had no precedent in the history of Turkish 
nationalism, in which its elite and underdog 
factions were normally separated.41
 All in all, nationalist associations have 
maintained their key features while, since 
the 1990s, addressing a wider and more 
diverse clientele. They are still greatly at-
tached to values such as the Turkish-Islam-
ic synthesis, pan-Turkism and an alleged 
Turkish folkloric heritage (such as Dokuz 
Işık, Ergenekon and Kızıl Elma). Never-
theless, they have been able to appear less 
strict and more flexible, allowing them 
to reach a wider audience.  This outreach 
apparently has had major political conse-
quences. Under the extraordinary political 
circumstances of the early 2000s, segments 
of nationalist associations cooperated 
with ulusalcıs in what may be the greatest 
conspiracy against Turkey’s democratic 
regime since 1980: the Ergenekon affair.
The ergenekon Affair
 On June 12, 2007, 27 hand grenades 
were found in the flat of retired officer 
Oktay Yıldırım in Ümraniye, Istanbul. 
AKP for the perceived threat that the elec-
tion of an AKP candidate to the presidency 
would pose to the republic. They turned, 
however, into a vehicle for ulusalcı person-
alities. The crushing victory of the AKP in 
the July 2007 parliamentary elections was 
the first blow against the ulusalcı move-
ment.  It showed that, despite the large 
demonstrations, the movement represented 
only a small minority of the Turkish peo-
ple. A second, heavier blow was dealt with 
the uncovering of the Ergenekon affair.
nationalist Associations
 Nationalist associations such as the 
Hearths of Idealism (Ülkü Ocakları) have 
long been a fixture of politics in Turkey.  
Ülkü Ocakları has always been the focal 
point of the MHP’s young militant base, 
where the ideological identity of the com-
munity is determined. The associations have 
been more radical than the MHP proper 
in terms of ideological lines and political 
activities.37 Nationalist associations were al-
ways suspected of involvement in criminal 
activities; their aggressiveness and strong 
tendency towards physical violence were 
often a source of embarrassment for the 
MHP, which tried to veil and contain them.38 
 In the 1990s, these associations faced 
the challenge of pop-nationalism, espoused 
by young, mainly uneducated, sympathiz-
ers. Pop-nationalism was a “risk-free, 
loose relationship between the oblivious 
sympathizers and the nationalist com-
munity”; pop-nationalists participated in 
demonstrations in places like bars, football 
grounds and nightclubs using nationalist 
slogans as a form of entertainment without 
actually taking sides or even understand-
ing the ideology.39 On the other hand, the 
traditional leaders thought they should not 
altogether reject these potential followers, 
despite the fact that the pop-nationalists 
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winner; Kurdish political leaders such as 
Ahmet Türk, Leyla Zana, Sebahat Tuncel 
and Osman Baydemir; as well as Fehmi 
Koru, columnist for the liberal Islamist 
daily Yeni Şafak. Through these acts, they 
planned to provoke one more military coup 
in 2009, bringing Turkey’s democratization 
process and EU accession negotiations to a 
precipitous end.
 Ergenekon suffered a first heavy blow 
on January 23, 2008, when 33 people 
were arrested, including Veli Küçük, a 
retired army general; Fikret Karadağ, a 
retired army colonel; Sami Hoştan, a key 
figure in the Susurluk affair, a car accident 
in 1996 that shocked Turkey by revealing 
the links between the deep state and orga-
nized crime; Güler Kömürcü, a columnist 
of the daily Akşam; and Kemal Kerinç-
siz,43 a lawyer who repeatedly attracted 
publicity through his lawsuits against 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and 
Orhan Pamuk, as well as the organization 
of an academic conference on the Arme-
nian question in 2005.
 Küçük, seen as the most prominent 
of all the detainees, was thought to be the 
founder of JİTEM (Jandarma İstihbarat 
ve Terörle Mücadele), a clandestine orga-
nization of the Turkish Gendarmerie and 
an indispensable component of the deep 
state.  JİTEM had the alleged mission to 
instigate terrorist attacks that would then 
be attributed to other groups, Islamist or 
nationalist. He was suspected of involve-
ment in the assassination of a senior judge 
on Turkey’s Supreme Administrative 
Court in May 2006, a bomb attack against 
the Istanbul premises of the secularist 
daily Cumhuriyet in the same month, and 
even the assassination of the Armenian 
journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. 
Evidence found during the police opera-
tion only reinforced these suspicions.
Evidence uncovered by police provided 
the key to uncovering the Ergenekon 
organization, a fruit of the cooperation 
between the Turkish “deep state” (derin 
devlet) and far-right extremists. Named af-
ter the mythical location of the birth of the 
Turkish nation, Ergenekon has a member-
ship base consisting of followers of both 
nationalist and ulusalcı groups: retired 
military and police officers, intellectuals 
and lawyers, as well as rogue elements. 
Although a direct relationship between the 
Ergenekon organization and the ulusalcı 
movement cannot be substantiated, Er-
genekon is a product of the ideological 
fermentation in which ulusalcı associa-
tions have played a catalytic role. The list 
of Ergenekon defendants ranged across 
the Turkish political spectrum from left to 
right. In addition, the very same rallying 
points — anti-imperialism, fear of global-
ization, fear of disintegration and mistrust 
of the AKP — that brought together the 
Red Apple Coalition appear to have con-
stituted the reasons for the establishment 
of the Ergenekon group.
 Ergenekon’s roots can be traced to 
the parastatal organizations founded with 
U.S. support in Southern European coun-
tries42 in the aftermath of World War II 
to avert the real or perceived threat of a 
communist takeover. Yet, while in Greece 
or Italy these organizations were eventu-
ally neutralized by the late 1970s, they 
remained largely intact in Turkey and were 
even revitalized by the 1980 coup. Accord-
ing to the indictment, the Ergenekon group 
was determined to derail what they saw as 
Turkey’s course towards partition, namely 
democratization. They developed links to 
organized crime with the aim of orchestrat-
ing the assassination of prominent liberal 
intellectuals and minority leaders:  Orhan 
Pamuk, Turkey’s first and only Nobel Prize 
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organizing an armed terror group and or-
chestrating a coup attempt. However, this 
document did not include charges against 
the latest group of defendants, including 
Eruygur and Tolon. These followed in a 
separate indictment. The untouchability 
of the Turkish military was questioned 
for the first time. Several waves of arrests 
followed until, on Wednesday, January 7, 
2009, a new series of arrests involved 30 
persons, including three retired generals, 
Erdal Şenel, Kemal Yavuz and Tuncer 
Kılınç, the general who had made the 
controversial statement in 2002; a former 
president of the Higher Education Council 
(Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu, YÖK), Kemal 
Gürüz; and nine low- and mid-level active-
duty officers. 
 Reaction to the new judicial actions 
was varied.46  Chief of the General Staff 
İlker Basbuğ had a six-hour meeting with 
the commanders of land, air and sea forces. 
Thereafter, he had unannounced meetings 
with President Abdullah Gül and Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in an ap-
parent attempt to show the military’s seri-
ous concern about these developments.47 
The news had a negative impact on the 
financial market, which slumped more than 
5 percent on that day.
 The arrest of the generals brought at-
tention to a news story from the magazine 
Nokta of March 2007.48 Nokta published 
what it claimed to be excerpts from the di-
ary of retired Admiral Özden Örnek. They 
included information about two coup plots, 
Sarıkız and Ayışığı, against the AKP gov-
ernment in 2004 organized by Eruygur, To-
lon and other top-ranking officers. Shortly 
thereafter, Örnek claimed that the docu-
ments were forgeries.  The police raided 
the offices of Nokta, and the magazine 
had to suspend publication. Following the 
arrest of Eruygur and Tolon, information 
 As the Ergenekon affair was unfold-
ing, many commentators made a careful 
distinction between what they called the 
“small” and the “big” Ergenekon. The 
“small” Ergenekon referred to the group 
of officers, lawyers, journalists and oth-
ers arrested in the police operations of 
January 2008. Most of these detainees 
belonged to the fringe of Turkish society 
and traditional nationalist groups and had 
limited social status and appeal. The “big” 
Ergenekon referred to a group of gener-
als, leading journalists and academics 
who belonged to ulusalcı circles and were 
suspected to be the masterminds behind 
the Ergenekon group. Most columnists 
doubted that the investigation would dare 
to touch them. The arrests on March 23, 
2008, of İlhan Selçuk, chief columnist 
of the daily Cumhuriyet; Doğu Perinçek, 
leader of the Workers’ Party (İşçi Partisi-
İP); and Kemal Alemdaroğlu, former 
rector of Istanbul University, gave the first 
hint that the prosecutors would not be will-
ing to spare prominent suspects.44 Yet few 
expected the twist the events took on July 
1, 2008, when two retired four-star gener-
als, Şener Eruygur and Hurşit Tolon, were 
among a group of high-profile suspects de-
tained.45 Eruygur was the president of the 
Ataturkist Thought Association (Atatürkçü 
Düşünce Derneği, ADD), an NGO that 
took a leading role in organizing the mas-
sive anti-AKP “Republic demonstrations” 
in spring 2007, which aimed to avert the 
appointment of a prominent AKP figure to 
the presidency of the country. 
 In a state where the military has been 
held as untouchable and the perpetrators of 
military coups have not been held account-
able for their deeds, these arrests were 
indeed a seminal event. In a 2,455-page 
indictment against 86 persons involved in 
the Ergenekon affair, charges referred to 
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Destekleme Derneği, ÇYDD),52 was also 
perceived as retaliation for ÇYDD activi-
ties promoting secular education.53 In the 
view of some analysts, the Ergenekon affair 
served as a pretext for the AKP to purge 
its political and ideological opponents and 
consolidate its hegemony.54
 On the other hand, the major opposi-
tion Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
openly took the side of the defendants. 
Ever since the outbreak of the Ergenekon 
affair, CHP members have argued that 
Ergenekon is an AKP ploy to eliminate its 
political opponents. The CHP leader Deniz 
Baykal even came to the point of arguing 
that, “if the Prime Minister is Ergenekon’s 
prosecutor, Deniz Baykal is its attorney.”55 
Following a wave of arrests in January 
2009, Baykal repeated in a special news 
conference,
... we are looking at a political case 
and not a legal trial. In this case, 
we don’t see the application of the 
law but rather a political settling of 
accounts by the use of the law.... 
We have seen this only in periods of 
regime change, similar to the period 
before Khomeini and Hitler….56
 Notwithstanding the significant judi-
cial shortcomings in the Ergenekon pro-
cess, this statement showed that the CHP 
seemed to line up with the most radical 
elements in the bureaucracy, leaving its al-
legiance to the rule of law and democratic 
principles in question. The new leader of 
the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who suc-
ceeded Baykal in May 2010 and was ex-
pected to reconfigure his party’s relations 
with the state bureaucracy, did not depart 
from his predecessor’s policy on this.
 The unraveling of the Ergenekon affair 
has shown the significance of ulusalcılık 
for Turkish politics and is a milestone for 
reinforcing the Nokta claims appeared in 
the media, in addition to information about 
two additional coup plots, Eldiven and 
Yakamoz, and a set of covert operations 
aiming to wreak social havoc, polarize 
existing divisions in the country and cre-
ate conditions facilitating a military coup.  
Both Eruygur and Tolon had acquired lead-
ing positions in Turkey’s nationalist-secu-
larist civil society in the aftermath of their 
retirement. Allegations arose that increas-
ing pressure against the AKP government 
was not only limited to peaceful demon-
strations. It may have included the murder 
of the Catholic priest Andrea Santoro in 
Trabzon in February 2006, bomb attacks 
against the offices of Cumhuriyet in May 
2006, the attack against Turkey’s Supreme 
Administrative Court (Danıştay) in May 
2006 and even the murder of Hrant Dink in 
January 2007.49 
 No definite judgments can be made 
about the Ergenekon affair before the court 
delivers its verdict. Nevertheless, while 
Ergenekon may shed light on some of the 
darkest pages of Turkish political history, 
there have been significant shortcomings 
related to the legal procedures. Severe 
violations of the human rights of some 
defendants were reported.50 The treatment 
of some defendants also became a cause of 
concern, as in the case of Kuddusi Okkır, 
who was diagnosed with late-stage cancer 
while he was in jail and passed away days 
after his release. The arrest of 83-year-old 
journalist İlhan Selçuk at 4:30 a.m., osten-
sibly to prevent him from fleeing — while 
he was in fact being guarded by the police  
following numerous death threats by Isla-
mists — was another telling example.51 The 
raid on the house of the 73-year-old and 
terminally ill Türkan Saylan, founder and 
president of the Association for the Sup-
port of Progressive Life (Çağdaş Yaşamı 
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the AKP, a party that had won approxi-
mately 47 percent of the popular vote less 
than a year before.57 A decision by the 
Constitutional Court on June 5, 2008, an-
nulled a constitutional amendment allow-
ing the use of the headscarf and questioned 
the very principle of popular sovereignty.58 
On the other hand, Istanbul prosecutor 
Zekeriya Öz, who, with his assistants Me-
hmet Pekgüzel and Nihat Taşkın, has been 
running the investigation of the Ergenekon 
affair, has become the protagonist in what 
might be a turning point in the struggle 
against the deep state. In both the military 
and the judiciary, there appeared to be a 
division regarding the role of the bureau-
cracy in Turkish politics and society. While 
some were adamant on maintaining the 
tutelary role the bureaucracy had secured 
in the early republican years, others were 
willing to give it up in the process of Tur-
key’s democratic consolidation and adapt 
to the norms of a fully democratic state.
conclusion
 Turkish nationalism has undergone 
significant transformation since the 1980s. 
The end of the Cold War allowed for rap-
prochement between leftist and rightist 
forces, which found a common enemy in 
globalization and Turkey’s European inte-
gration. The rise of ulusalcılık is the most 
characteristic fruit of this process. With 
an anti-Western and isolationist agenda, 
it aimed to represent the grievances of 
segments of Turkey’s society. These for 
the first time included members of the 
secular elite and underdog nationalists. A 
plethora of ulusalcı associations emerged 
and aimed to counter Turkey’s democratic 
reform process, while benefiting from the 
tools and opportunities globalization and 
modernization secured. Their operation has 
been a prime example of how “uncivil” 
ulusalcı associations and nationalist mo-
bilization in Turkey. While not all ulusalcı 
associations were involved in Ergenekon, a 
large number of the Ergenekon defendants 
were leading figures of the ulusalcı move-
ment. Opposition to the AKP government 
and the reforms that are seen as an essen-
tial part of Turkey’s democratic consoli-
dation and European integration united 
a disparate group of elite and underdog 
nationalist and ulusalcı elements. While 
ulusalcı associations gained the support of 
a considerable part of the secularist middle 
class through their campaign against the 
adulteration of Turkish secularism by the 
AKP, they suffered a blow through the 
revelations of the Ergenekon affair. Their 
alleged links with the deep state put their 
public legitimacy into question.
 Moreover, one of the most interest-
ing results of the Ergenekon affair is the 
revelation of significant divisions within 
the Turkish military and judiciary. It ap-
pears that the former chief of the Turkish 
General Staff, Hilmi Özkök, has been one 
of the primary targets of the Ergenekon 
group. Being perceived as weak or even 
“crypto-Islamist” because of his unwill-
ingness to undertake initiatives against 
the AKP government, Özkök represented 
a Turkish military willing to accept the 
end of its tutelary role. His meeting with 
President Abdullah Gül aimed at alleviat-
ing social tension and his repeated public 
support for Turkey’s EU integration project 
have reconfirmed this stance. In addition, 
his refusal to disprove the existence of the 
Ergenekon-led coup attempts indicates that 
the case was not simply an AKP forgery 
against its political opponents. 
 The same division runs across the 
judiciary. On the one hand, Turkey’s chief 
prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, filed 
on March 14, 2008, a closure case against 
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its democratic regime. The uncovering of 
the Ergenekon affair has brought to the 
fore divisions within Turkish society that 
underline some of the most serious chal-
lenges Turkey has ever faced. 
society can mobilize against the goal of 
democratic consolidation. In particular, 
the Ergenekon affair manifested how both 
traditional and new nationalists could co-
operate with the common aim of derailing 
Turkey’s European integration by toppling 
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